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This only is denied even to God, the power to undo what has been done – 
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics.1  
 
In the solemn aftermath of Charles Lindbergh’s historic solo flight across the 
Atlantic, Walter Benjamin indulged himself in what he calls the ‘arabesque of a joke’. 
To re-tell the punchline here: Benjamin relates that, on Lindbergh’s arrival in Paris 
on 10 May 1927 someone telephoned all the newspapers with the ‘news’ that the 
École Normale Supérieure had decided to bestow upon the great aviator the honour 
of being ‘a former student’. Yet, it seems that all the city newspaper editors were 
taken in by the hoax: a Lindbergh lookalike was paraded for photographers, the story 
was written up as fact and the aviator became, fleetingly, a Normalien. This self-
declared arabesque of a joke – an ‘arabesque’ is a pose in Ballet in which one leg is 
extended backwards at right angles, the torso bent forwards, and the arms 
outstretched, one forwards and one backwards – was not only a joke, though, 
because it, too, extended forwards and backwards into time. In Benjamin’s words, 
this new act of re-writing the past was actually the secular conclusion of a much older 
theological project: 
 
Among the medieval Scholastics, there was a school that described God's 
omnipotence by saying: He could alter even the past, unmake what had really 
happened, and make real what had never happened. As we can see, in the case 
of enlightened newspaper editors, God is not needed for this task; a 
bureaucrat is all that is required.2 
 
 
To be sure, Benjamin is clearly recalling here a – today rather obscure and almost 
eccentric –theological debate in the Middle Ages about God’s power. It turned on the 
classic question of whether God have the power do absolutely anything He wants or 
is He in some way bound by the laws of nature, physics or even his prior decisions. 
According to the medieval theologian Peter Damiani (1007-72), who is arguably the 
most extreme spokesperson for the doctrine of divine omnipotence, God’s absolute 
power over his creation finds its best expression in the apparently fixed order of the 
past. For Damiani, to recall his most famous or notorious claim, ‘God has power to 
restore virginity to any woman no matter how many times she has been married, and 
to renew in her the seal of integrity, just as she was when taken from her mother’s 
womb’.3 If Benjamin never comments on this debate about divine omnipotence 
anywhere else in his work, it could be argued that – for all the vast differences 
between them – his philosophy of history re-activates its defining theme, namely, the 
real redemption of the past. In one sense, Benjamin’s famous claim that the past still 
holds a ‘weak messianic power [Kraft]’ over the present might be read as a historical 
materialist re-constellation of Damiani’s own idea of the past as a theatre for the 
exercise of divine power.4  
 
This article is a set of notes towards a new genealogy of Benjamin’s philosophy of 
history from its beginnings in the ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’ (1921) through to 
its most complete formulation in the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1941). It 
seeks, in particular, to explore the origins of a notoriously obscure claim that 
Benjamin makes in his Second Thesis: ‘happiness’, he writes, ‘exists only in the air 
we have breathed, among people we could have talked to, women who could have 
given themselves to us’ (‘Theses’, p. 254). To risk stating the obvious, Benjamin's 
theory of what he calls Glück – happiness, happenstance, chance – is one of the most 
cryptic aspects of his thought because, as he describes it, it seems to consist primarily 
in memories of experiences that never actually happened: people who could have 
been our friends or lovers but were not. If such virtual ‘experiences’ never took place, 
Benjamin insists that they somehow still exist in the present and are capable of being 
redeemed – brought back or retrieved – in the future. In what follows, I will seek to 
argue that the origins of Benjamin's theory of happiness lie in an experimental 
synthesis of theology (divine omnipotence; messianism; redemption), psychoanalysis 
(involuntary memory, trauma, repression) and cosmological materialisms (eternal 
recurrence, constellation, shock) and which produces something we might 
paradoxically call a ‘political theology’ of psychoanalysis. What, then, are the roots of 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history? How, if at all, can we reconcile the classic 
messianic and materialist antinomies of his thought? Finally, what happens if we 
take absolutely literally – and not merely figuratively or imagistically – Benjamin’s 






In a discussion with Desiderius, Rector of the Abbey of Monte Cassino, sometime 
around 1065, the Benedictine monk Peter Damiani was asked whether he thought 
God could restore the virginity of a fallen woman. It was no idle speculation but a 
question that brought back to life a long theological debate about the limits of divine 
omnipotence. As Damiani well knew, it had already been answered centuries earlier 
by a distinguished theologian: ‘I dare say although God can do all things’, Jerome 
argued, ‘he cannot raise up a virgin after her fall’.5 However, if Jerome was willing to 
place limits upon divine power – and undoing what has been done is something even 
God cannot do – Peter staunchly defended divine omnipotence. To unpack the 
argument of his letter to Desiderius, ‘On Divine Omnipotence in the Restoration of 
What is Destroyed and Undoing What is Done’, Damiani’s God has the power to act 
outside of the laws of nature despite – or because of – the fact that He himself has 
created those laws: ‘he who brought nature into being, at will easily abrogates the 
necessity of nature’ (‘On Divine Omnipotence’, p. 370). For Peter, God’s omnipotence 
even or especially extends into what is apparently the most irrevocable order of all: 
the past. If God is not subject to time, if He exists in an eternal now outside past, 
present and future, if His power cannot diminish or increase with the passage of 
time, then ‘God can cause things that have happened, not to have happened’ (p. 383). 
This is why we can say without absurdity that He can unmake what has been made: 
‘we also say that God has the power after Rome was founded that it be non-founded 
(p. 382). In this way, Damiani concludes that Desiderius’ question could be answered 
with an emphatic ‘yes’: ‘the omnipotent God has power to restore virginity to any 
woman, no matter how many times she has been married, and to renew in her the 
seal of integrity, just as she was when taken from her mother’s womb’ (p. 353).6 What 
is at stake in the debate around divine omnipotence? 
 
To be sure, Peter Damiani’s hyperbolic apology for God’s absolute power is – for all 
its audacity – arguably just an extension of the classic Christian doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo. It seems entirely logical at first glance to argue that, as well as the power to 
create something out of nothing, God possesses the equal and opposite power of 
what John D. Caputo nicely calls reductio ad nihilum: to return something to 
nothing, to annihilate.7 At the same time, though, Damiani’s God also constitutes the 
beginning of a famous debate within medieval theology between the competing 
demands of necessity and contingency that will persist for more than 200 years. For 
Damiani, God’s absolute power over his creation is purchased at the cost of divesting 
the created order of any necessary rational or natural structure of its own and 
consigning it to a state of total contingency. In ‘On Divine Omnipotence’, Damiani 
confronts us with a state of exception in which the natural, rational and logical order 
is subject to the seemingly arbitrary will of a God who may interrupt, reconstitute or 
annihilate it at any moment: ‘he who created nature has power to change the natural 
order as he pleases; and while ordaining that all created things should be subject to 
the dominion of nature, reserved to the dominion of his own power the obedience of 
a compliant nature’ (pp. 370-1).  
 
It quickly became clear that Damiani’s disturbingly radical solution to the ancient 
aporia of necessity and contingency – God’s power is not obliged to, or constrained 
by, the world He has created but can change it any point – was tantamount to a kind 
of divine anarchism or even gnosticism from the perspective of the Christian 
Aristotelian theology of the 12th century. As a means of reconciling Greek necessity 
with Christian contingency, Scholastic theology devised the famous distinction 
between God’s absolute power (de potentia absoluta) and His ordained power (de 
potentia ordinata): God has the power to do whatever He wills but he freely limits 
himself to act in accordance with what he has already ordained. 8 To put it simply, 
God could have created any world he wanted – or not created it all – but the fact is 
that He chose to create the world as it is, and so will He will not change it. If 
Scholastic theology obviously does not wish to return to the pagan universe of 
Aristotelian necessitarianism – creation remains the product of an original divine 
decision – it does seek to contain God’s absolute power within the realm of 
hypothetical, counter-factual possibility: it refers to what could have happened, but 
did not, because He decided otherwise. This attempt to bind God to His prior 
decisions also restores a certain immanent, rational even ‘economic’9 order to 
creation as the product of divine ordination. For Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), God 
may well possess the absolute power to restore the virginity of a fallen women but 
this act would be contrary to the laws of nature that He himself has already ordained. 
In Aquinas’ account, God’s power is not demonstrated in his capacity to do 
‘incomprehensible or unimaginable things, e.g. to make the past not to have been’ – 
and so Peter’s hypothetical fallen woman must remain forever fallen: ‘God can 
remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the 
fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her’.10 
 
For the Nominalists of the later Middle Ages, however, God’s absolute power could 
never be constrained by the chains of his ordained power. It is not necessary here to 
rehearse the general implications of the Nominalist Revolution for the kind of 
Christian Aristotelianism promulgated by Thomist theology – the move from realism 
to empiricism, from universals to singularities and so on – to observe the extent to 
which it offers an (albeit qualified) rehabilitation of Damiani’s God.11 As Michael 
Gillespie observes, Duns Scotus (1266-1308) and William of Ockham (1287-1347) 
restore God to his original sovereign power after Thomism’s attempt to bind Him to 
his prior decisions: ‘omnipotence means the supremacy of God’s potentia absoluta 
over His potentia ordinata’.12 Yet, revealingly, it is again the past – as the supposed 
last refuge of necessity in being – that becomes the arena in which the theological 
battle over divine power is joined. To Damiani’s classic question ‘Can God make 
things otherwise than he has ordered them to be made?’, for instance, Scotus 
answers an emphatic ‘yes’: God’s absolute power does not describe a merely 
hypothetical realm of possibility – which could have been realized in the past, but 
was not, and now never will be – but a real capacity that He can actualize at any 
given moment.13 If the original Scholastic distinction between absolute and ordained 
power was never intended to describe a field of divine action – God chose to create 
this world, and once He made that choice, as we have seen, He would never reverse it 
– Scotus’ so-called theory of ‘synchronic contingency’ re-inscribes divine potentia 
absoluta as a field of present agency: God retains the power to make things otherwise 
than He ordered them to be made at any point whatsoever. In this radical 
operationalization of God’s absolute power, Scotus renders creation itself absolutely 
contingent for both divine and human alike: any given state of affairs is accompanied 
– not merely in an earlier or later moment but at every moment – by the 
simultaneous logical and real possibility that it could be otherwise. 
 
In re-asserting God’s real power to re-make – or even unmake – what He has already 
made, Duns Scotus gives new life to Damiani’s original thought experiment. It is 
possible to find one more – albeit highly specialized – recuperation of divine 
omnipotence over the past in William of Ockham’s treatise On Predestination and 
God’s Foreknowledge with respect to Future Contingents.14 As is well-documented, 
this treatise is an attempt to solve the classic problem of theological fatalism: how 
can humans be free agents if God always already knows everything that is going to 
happen to them? To square the circle between freedom and determinacy, Ockham 
invents a distinction between what Nelson Pike famously calls ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts 
about the past: a hard fact is one which solely concerns the past (e.g. ‘John went to 
London yesterday’) whereas a soft fact is one whose factuality is conditional upon 
some future event taking place (e.g. ‘Jane will go to Paris tomorrow’).15 If God’s 
foreknowledge of the future must be considered a soft fact – insofar as it obviously 
concerns things that have not happened yet – this means that its factuality does not 
necessarily exclude the operation of human agency or natural contingency before the 
event takes place: Jane may well decide to go to Berlin instead tomorrow, not Paris, 
or something completely unforeseen could happen which means she can’t go 
anywhere at all. For Ockhamists, God’s past foreknowledge (as soft fact) would not 
be negated or contradicted by this future contingency – as if God had somehow been 
proved ‘wrong’ or we had succeeded in changing God’s belief – but rather this 
contingency retroactively transforms what we understand God’s foreknowledge to 
be: we have determined through our own agency what the past really was like. In 
positing this special category of the past – open, contingent and future-oriented 
rather than closed, necessary and past-dependent – Ockham thus accedes to at least 
the bare logical possibility that the past can be ‘changed’ by the future: certain past 
‘facts’ could become radically counterfactual if the future contingencies to which they 
refer take place otherwise than predicted. 
 
What does Peter Damiani’s thought experiment bequeath to political theology? It is 
now widely recognized that this new activist paradigm of God’s absolute power as 
entirely unbound by and irreducible to ordained power was translated, whether 
rightly or wrongly, into a paradigm of political power within both the ecclesiastical 
and civil orders in the Middle Ages. As Courtenay observes, the Pope famously 
possessed ‘plenitude of power (plenitudo potestatis) through which he could, on an 
individual basis, temporarily suspend or alter particular, lesser laws through 
dispensations or privileges for the common good of the church at large (the ratio 
ecclesiae)’ (Capacity and Volition, p. 92). To turn to modern political theory, Peter 
Damiani’s apology for divine power also constitutes something close to the 
theological origin of sovereign exceptionality: Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology 
(1922) compares the omnipotent God to the omnipotent lawgiver and his 
Constitutional Theory (1928) specifically draws an analogy between the medieval 
theological concept of God’s potentia absoluta and political constitution-making 
power.16 Perhaps Benjamin’s own ‘Critique of Violence’ (1921) – for all its difference 
from Schmitt – does not escape this history: his distinctions between justice and law, 
between law-making violence and law-preserving violence between mythic violence 
and divine violence could equally be read as a ‘cryptotheological’ re-activation of the 
opposition between absolute and ordained power.17 If all this has already been well-
documented, though, I want to propose that Damiani’s real (poisonous) gift to 
political theology is what Caputo calls that curious power of reductio ad nihilum – 
the sovereign capacity to render worlds uncreated, cities like Rome unfounded, lives 
unlived. For me, Damiani’s God is sovereign not merely over life and death but over 
something I want to call unbearable life: He places the subject in an original state of 
exception where its very existence becomes a question of sovereign decision.18 In 
order to reinforce this point, I want to consider one final disturbing counter-factual 
possibility that arises from Damiani’s famous thought experiment about the fallen 
women restored to virginity that (to my knowledge) has never been entertained by 
any of the theologian’s commentators. What if the woman who lost her virginity had 
gotten pregnant? What if she already has a child at the moment God decides to 
restore her virginity? What will happen to that child after God decides she never lost 
her virginity in the first place – will it continue to exist as a kind of miraculous virgin 






In Benjamin’s philosophy of history, I want to argue that we encounter a curious 
historical materialist recapitulation (Wieder-holung, bringing back) of this medieval 
theological debate about divine power. 19 It may be relevant here that the writing of 
the ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’ – which Gershom Scholem dates to 1920-1 – 
coincides with the period of its author’s deepest immersion in scholastic theology: 
Benjamin’s (later abandoned) plan for a Habilitationsschrift in 1920 focused on a 
reading of Duns Scotus on language. To be sure, Benjamin’s theory of the redemption 
of history has many plausible origins –Proust, Baudelaire, the Christian idea of 
apokatastasis or the Judaic tikkun – but I want to propose here that it can also be 
read as a profane or immanent re-writing of the concept of divine omnipotence over 
the past: a divine power ‘from below’.20 If Peter Damiani insists upon God’s power to 
change the past. Benjamin famously assigns to the present generation what we will 
see to be an equivalent weak messianic capacity to short-circuit the teleological 
progression of time from past to present – as well as the ontological progression of 
being from the potential to the actual – by synchronically actualizing real but virtual 
alternative potentialities that lie unrealized in history. This attempt to redeem what 
we might call the originary ‘potentiality’ of the past – to restore the totality of 
possibilities life originally promises us but cannot in its natural finitude deliver upon 
– also immanently re-activates the idea of the past as a contingent field of force for 
the operation of (albeit human rather than divine) power. In reading Benjamin’s 
historical materialism in this ancient theological context, I want to argue that we can 
also begin to make sense of one what I have suggested is one of its most essential – 
yet still most enigmatic – tasks. Why does Benjamin insist that what is called 
happiness in the past is not simply the dead, the forgotten or the oppressed but 
rather what was never lived?  
 
To answer this question, I want to focus on Benjamin’s famous series of late 
aphorisms which were published as the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1941).  
It is, of course, the over-arching objective of the Theses to overcome what they see as 
the twin fatalism of both the vulgar naturalist theory of historicism and the social 
democratic idea of progress which leaves them in thrall to the idea of a linear 
progression of ‘homogeneous, empty time’ from past to future (‘Theses’, p. 254). For 
Benjamin, the Theses famously propose that the true task of the historical materialist 
is not to recuperate the past ‘as it really was’ but rather just the opposite: what must 
be redeemed from the past is not what once existed for us, so that it may exist once 
again in the present, but rather what never existed in the first place. If the past really 
is as contingent as the future – in the sense that it contains a permanent excess over 
its own determined actualization as historical past – then the true litmus test of this 
thought experiment is the power to re-live a past that was wholly unlived. In the 
Second Thesis, Benjamin makes absolutely clear that what his philosophy seeks to 
redeem is an original state of happiness that never was:  
 
Reflection shows us that our image of happiness [Gluck] is thoroughly 
coloured by the time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us. 
The kind of happiness that could arouse envy in us exists only in the air we 
have breathed, among people we could have talked to, women who could have 
given themselves to us. In other words, our image of happiness is indissolubly 
bound up with the image of redemption. The same applies to our view of the 
past, which is the concern of history. The past carries with it a temporal index 
by which it is referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement between 
past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like 
every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak 
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim (‘Theses’, p. 254). 
 
 
It is clear even in this notoriously obscure passage that what we envy is not simply a 
past that was once really present and is now not – the past of lost causes, oppressed 
classes or forgotten barbarism that official history occludes – but an absolute past 
that was never present in the first place. As Benjamin describes it, Gluck – and we 
should perhaps hear the alternative meaning of ‘chance’ or ‘happenstance’ here too – 
is a political affect that exists only in the counter-factual past of contingent 
possibilities that were never, in reality, lived by us: ‘the air we have breathed’, ‘people 
we could have talked to’ and ‘women who could have given themselves to us’ – but 
did not. To put it in Werner Harmacher’s words, Benjamin offers us a political 
theology of the ‘miss’ – the lost, deferred or unseized possibility – that ‘only proves to 
be a possibility in the miss, and only by virtue of this miss preserves itself as a 
possibility for the future’ (‘Walter Benjamin on Historical Time’, p. 39). If the 
naturalist perspective of historicism sees this void or excess at the heart of history as 
a simple absence, what the historical materialist recognizes is that this missing past 
is emphatically not beyond redemption; indeed, it is precisely because it never 
existed in the past that it exists as a real possibility for the present. By arguing that 
our happiness refers to a past that never actually happened, Benjamin is not 
consigning that past to the hypothetical realm of ‘what might have been’ but 
preserving it in virtual form as the locus for future action: what never happened in 
the past does not belong there, but persists as a possibility in the future. For 
Benjamin, historical materialism transcends any diachronic succession from past to 
future to create a radical synchronicity – a constellation – between then and now: ‘A 
historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events 
like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has 
formed with a definite earlier one’ (‘Theses’, p. 263). This unlived past continues to 
exist as a real synchronic contingency (to recall Scotus’ concept) that is capable of 
being actualized by the present generation in the ‘now-time’ (Jetzeit) of danger. In 
restoring to humanity the infinity of possibilities that were foreclosed by life’s own 
finitude, I want to argue that Benjamin’s historical materialist repetition of the 
theology of divine power thus seeks to gives the absolute past a future: we in the 
present generation are bestowed with the power to realize the unrealized possibilities 
of history.  
 
For Benjamin, the mental organ or apparatus which captures this attempt to redeem 
a past that never was is what Marcel Proust calls ‘involuntary memory [mémoire 
involontaire]’. It is his opening gambit in the essay ‘The Image in Proust’ (1929), 
recall, that what involuntary memory ‘remembers’ is not ‘a life as it actually was, but 
a life that was remembered by the one who lived it’.21 As he goes on to make clear in 
later essays like  ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939), this distinction itself turns 
upon Freud’s account of the ‘incompatibility’ of consciousness and memory in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1921): Freud famously claims in this text that 
consciousness is the living organism’s defense mechanism which protects it against 
the shock of external stimuli leaving a trace as memory. Yet, what this means is that 
the memory becomes the repository of traumatic stimuli too powerful for 
consciousness to permit us to directly experience’.22 To put it in Benjamin’s words in 
the Baudelaire essay, Proustian involuntary memory is likewise a memory of what 
was never experienced consciously as such:  
 
[O]nly what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not 
happened to the subject as an experience [Erlebnis], can become a component 
of mémoire involontaire.23  
 
If psychoanalysis enables us to re-conceptualize Benjamin’s concept of historical 
redemption in more immanent terms – a past which was never consciously lived first 
time around but is (re-)lived in every traumatic shock – I think we can still find a 
messianic residue even within this apparently modern theory of memory: what 
Proust’s involuntary memory remembers is not simply Freud’s return of a repressed 
or unconscious past trauma, in Benjamin’s account, but something close to 
Damiani’s re-activation of an absolute past that was never present even as traumatic 
experience. This is why Benjamin argues that what returns in involuntary memory is 
paradoxically the ‘trauma’ of what never happened to us, but which is still 
‘somewhere remembered’: Proust is ‘filled with the insight that none of us has time to 
live the true dramas of the life that we are destined for’, he writes, ‘This is what ages 
us – this and nothing else. The wrinkles and creases on our faces are the registration 
of the great passions, vices, insights that called on us; but we, the masters, were not 
home’ (‘The Image in Proust’, pp. 211-2). In this context, Benjamin psychoanalysis 
seems to take on the same (real or possible?) messianic dimension that is ascribed to 
translation in an essay like ‘The Task of the Translator’: 
 
It should be pointed out that certain correlative concepts retain their meaning, 
and possibly their significance, if they are not referred exclusively to man. One 
might, for example, speak of an unforgettable life or moment even if all men 
had forgotten it. If the nature of such life or moment required that it be 
unforgotten, the predicate would not imply a falsehood but merely a claim not 
fulfilled by men, and probably also a reference to a realm in which it is 
fulfilled: God’s remembrance.24 
 
 
In order to understand what this ‘realm’ of God’s remembrance might look like 
within the strict immanent perimeters of historical materialism, I want to turn to one 
final obscure source for Benjamin’s philosophy of history: the French 19th century 
political activist and theorist Louis-Auguste Blanqui’s theory of eternal recurrence.25 
It is Blanqui’s eccentric cosmological treaty Eternity According to the Stars (1872) –
which Benjamin himself apparently first encountered in 1938 – that we find a kind of 
historical materialist iteration of the theological cosmology of radical contingency at 
work in the debate around divine omnipotence. According to Blanqui’s materialist 
cosmology, every star is composed of a finite number of chemical elements but the 
universe itself is infinite: what this means is that every possible combination of 
material organization must necessarily play itself out temporally and spatially in 
order to fill the infinity of the universe.  To jump ahead to his remarkable conclusion, 
Blanqui’s claim is that this infinite recurrence of finite matter means that everything 
that has ever happened in our lives – or could have happened or will happen to us – 
will happen again or is even already happening somewhere in the universe to an 
infinite number of doppelgängers:  
 
We are, somewhere else, everything that we could have been down here. In 
addition to our whole life, to our birth and death, which we experience on a 
number of earths, we also live ten thousand different versions of it on other 
earths (Eternity According to the Stars, pp. 125-6). 
If Benjamin himself read Blanqui’s theory somewhat fatalistically – as a kind of 
diabolic cosmological precursor to the endless repetition of the self-same which is 
commodity mass production26 – Miguel Vatter has recently argued that eternal 
recurrence actually offers a more positive material ground for Benjamin’s own 
messianic idea of history: ‘‘the happy life that could have been ours, but was not, 
does exist; it is the life of avatars in parallel universes where every possible variation 
of what did not happen, but could have happened, is actually alive and present’ 
(Republic of the Living, p. 322). For Vatter, what Benjamin’s philosophy of history 
adds to Blanqui’s cosmology is the intriguing possibility that the infinite number of 
doppelgängers which exist in parallel universes could overlap, experience and change 
each other’s timeline in order to ‘change’ history itself: I myself, not just some avatar 
of me, will be able to re-live and complete my past life in the future. In Blanqui’s 
multiverse – where an infinite set of avatars actualizes every possible contingency – 
we arguably find a kind of materialist space which is equivalent to what Benjamin 
calls the realm of ‘God’s remembrance’ in which nothing is lost or forgotten.  
 
What is at stake, then, in this curious constellation between Walter Benjamin and 
Peter Damiani, between weak and strong divine power, between the redemption of 
the women who could have given themselves to us and the fallen woman, married 
many times? To return to the central theme of this essay, I want to argue that what is 
taking place here is a – literal and metaphorical – contretemps between two 
competing versions of the politics of unbearable life: the power to render worlds 
uncreated, cities unfounded, worlds, lives unlived by political means. It was 
Benjamin’s 1927 claim, recall, that, Damiani’s God is no longer needed to change the 
past: ‘a bureaucrat is all that is required’. After a century of the politics of enforced 
disappearance, this ‘arabesque of a joke’ is no longer funny: what Leon Trotsky called 
the ‘Stalin School of Falsification’ in the 1930s – where old history books, policy 
documents, the minutes of meetings and even photographs would be retroactively 
changed to bring them into ideological line with the present – might be seen as 
political Daminanism on an industrial scale.27 For Stalin’s state bureaucracy, a 
disgraced figure like Nikolai Yezhov, the NKVD chief who was quietly airbushed out 
of a group photo with Comrade Stalin after his arrest and execution in 1939, was 
perhaps the closest equivalent to Damian’s fallen women: virginity in this case took 
the form of a (presumably ideologically more sound) stretch of the Moscow-Volga 
canal which now occupied the place where the unfortunate Yezhov once stood.28 If 
this politics of enforced disappearance has a philosophical origin, then, it arguably 
lies in Damiani’s metaphysics of radical contingency in which the past can be 
changed as easily as the future: what is at issue here is ‘a kind of violence that seeks 
not only to eradicate the person who is the target of enforced disappearance but also 
to erase the fact that the person ever existed’, Banu Bargu argues, ‘it is not only about 
the destruction of the individual but also the elimination of the individual’s prior 
presence’.29 Perhaps we might thus read Benjamin’s Theses as an attempt to critique 
Damiani’s political theology of unbearable life  - and the sovereign exceptionalism to 
which it gives rise – by seeking, weakly, immanently and ‘from below’ to make the 
unbearable bearable once more. This politics of (re-)appearance is not human not 
divine, weak not omnipotent, given to us not willed by us, experienced by us without 
ever fully becoming an object of experience to be grasped, equally capable of 
producing suffering as well as happiness – and even of missing its meeting or 
appointment with the past altogether and deferring it yet again – but nonetheless it 
continues to exist as a real task for the present generation. In Benjamin’s theory of a 
weak messianic power that gives us back the women who could have given 
themselves to us in the past but did not, we can find a kind of affirmative re-writing 
of Damiani’s thought experiment of the fallen women, married many times, who can 
be restored to virginity: what was prevented from ever happening in the past still 
exists in real but virtual form and we have the power to actualize it. What if the 
woman who could have given herself to us could still give herself? What if she, too, 







In the aftermath of Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic solo flight, Bertolt Brecht wrote 
the first of his Lehrstücke or ‘didactic plays’ for radio about the historic event: 
Lindbergh's Flight (Der Lindberghflug) was premiered at the Baaden-Baaden Music 
Festival in 1929. It appears that Brecht revised the play for its next performance on 
radio in 1930 to shift the focus away from the charismatic figure of Lindbergh 
himself to the collective labour which made his achievement possible. If Brecht’s 
original text focused on glorifying the heroism of Lindbergh, it is revealing that the 
later iteration – now entitled The Flight of the Lindberghs (Der Flug der 
Lindberghs) - changed the name of the aviator from a singular personal into a 
collective plural: ‘the Lindberghs’, ‘the Airmen’. For Benjamin, whose essay ‘What is 
Epic Theatre?’ (1939) is a kind of typology of Brechtian theatre, Brecht’s 
collectivization of the proper name ‘Lindbergh’ was the decisive step in breaking 
away from traditional mimetic theatre and producing the shock effect of the didactic: 
The Flight of the Lindberghs ‘is an exercise in refraction in which Brecht uses the 
singular experience [Erlebnis] as a source for the hues of “experience” [Erfahrung]’, 
Benjamin writes, ‘the experience that could be obtained only from Lindbergh’s 
effort’.30  
 
To draw this essay to a close, however, I want to recall a curious post-script to the 
story of Brecht’s political kenosis – emptying out – of the proper name ‘Lindbergh’. It 
seems that the dramatist was approached to approve a new radio production of the 
play in 1950 but only consented to do on the condition that Lindbergh’s name be 
removed completely from the script. As he explained in a letter to the 
Südwestrundfunk (Southwest Broadcasting Company), Brecht’s decision was a 
protest at Lindbergh’s ‘close ties with the Nazis’ and his ‘sinister role as a fascist in 
the USA’ in the years leading up to the Second World War: ‘The title of my radio play 
must therefore be changed to The Ocean Flight, the prologue must be spoken and 
Lindbergh’s name expunged’.31 If Lindbergh’s Flight had glorified Lindbergh’s 
individual achievement, and The Flight of the Lindberghs the collective achievement 
of the workers, this final version – now entitled The Flight across the Ocean (Der 
Ozeanflug) – became something close to a historical materialist parable about a man 
who gains the whole world only to lose his soul. In the concluding words of Brecht’s 
new prologue: ‘Ten years / Of fame and riches, and the wretch /Showed Hitler’s 
butchers how to fly /With deadly bombs. Therefore / Let his name be blotted out’ 
(Collected Plays 3, p. 321). 
 
In conclusion then, I would like to read Brecht’s reductio ad nihilum of Lindbergh as 
one more small exercise in the politics of unbearable life. It is possible to see The 
Flight across the Ocean as yet another attempt to ‘change the past’ which transforms 
the celebrated aviator into little more than the empty avatar of a collective labour 
process. As the protagonist of the new version of the play himself says, ‘My name 
doesn’t matter…I am so-and-s0’ (Collected Plays 3, p. 321). To re-write history in 
this way – actualizing latent potentialities that lie unrealized within it – Brecht’s play 
performs another Benjaminian redemption that returns us to a past every bit as 
open, contingent and unknowable as the future itself: the unlived past, the missed, 
unseized or deferred past, the past that never was. In Brecht’s Flight across the 
Ocean, then, Benjamin’s old ‘arabesque of a joke’ continues to echo backwards and 
forwards in time. What if the great aviator Charles Lindbergh, whose historical fate 
proves that time is not a chain of events but a single whole in which past, present and 
future all exist together, is the doppelgänger of that other famous flying machine 
imagined in Benjamin’s Ninth Thesis? 
 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the 
past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the 
pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress 
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